


GatorMUN XVI

Background Guide



Executive Yuan of
Taiwan, 2019

Esteemed Delegates,

I am proud to welcome you all to the Executive Yuan of Taiwan committee, and to GatorMUN XVI as a whole. My name is Charles Sherwood, and I am a third-year Chinese major here at UF. I have been involved in Model UN for over four years and have previously served as a crisis staffer in the Court of Casimir IV at GatorMUN XIV, and as the director for the United Nations Development Programme committee at GatorMUN XV. I hope that every delegate attending this year's conference will have as enriching an experience as I have had staffing and directing.

I became interested in directing a Taiwan committee soon after discussions of a US-China trade war began to dominate the news. It's clear to see that, despite future uncertainty, US-China relations and the complicated problems that define them will be a critical topic, if not *the* critical topic, in future international relations. While there has been much stir about trade imbalances in North Korea and the South China Sea, it is my firm belief that Taiwan will be the issue that most impacts US-China relations, for better or worse.

As I sit writing this letter from deep within China, I find that calling the "Taiwan issue" a thorny one is very much an understatement. From the deep scars created by the Opium Wars all the way to the 21st-century emergence of China, Taiwan's current predicament is tied closely to China's modern historical trajectory as the greatest challenger to US hegemony. While Taiwan was taped over as an issue for many years after China's rapprochement with the US in the 1970s, recent tensions in US-China tensions, along with increased incidents between Taiwan and mainland China, have made Taiwan rise again as a high-profile issue in international relations.

At the same time, it is important to understand that Taiwan is much more than an "issue." It is a vibrant community of some 23 million people that, despite its being caught between two superpowers, has been paving its own way into the future. While the committee will have its fair share of high-power politicking, it is the Executive Yuan's responsibility to these 23 million that will define the committee. While much will be said and done in committee about threats to Taiwan's independence, the Executive Yuan must also ensure that the society it's defending maintains its democratic and economic vibrancy in the face of both external *and* internal threats.

Position papers will not be required for this committee. Please email any questions you may have to gatormun@gmail.com. I hope to see you all at GatorMUN XVI!

Best of luck,

Charles Sherwood
Crisis Director

Rules of Procedure

Quorum

A majority of voting members answering to the roll at each session shall constitute a quorum for that session. This means that half plus one of all voting members are physically present. Quorum will be assumed consistent unless questioned through a Point of Order. Delegates may request to be noted as “Present” or “Present and Voting.”

ompany any motion for a Moderated Caucus. In a Motion to Set Speaking Time, a delegate may also specify a number of questions or comments to automatically affix to the Speaking Time. These designated questions or comments may also have Speaking Time or Response Time (in the case of a question) limits, but these are not required. The Director may rule any Motion to Set Speaking Time dilatory. This motion requires a simple majority. Any delegate may make this motion between formal speakers in an effort to change the Speaking Time.

Motion to Suspend the Rules for the Purpose of a Moderated Caucus

This motion must include three specifications

- a. Length of the Caucus
- b. Speaking Time. and
- c. Reason for the Caucus

During a moderated caucus, delegates will be called on to speak by the Committee Director. Delegates will raise their placards to be recognized. Delegates must maintain the same degree of decorum throughout a Moderated Caucus as in formal debate. This motion requires a simple majority to pass.

Motion to Suspend the Rules for the Purpose of an Unmoderated Caucus

This motion must include the length of the Caucus. During an unmoderated caucus, delegates may get up from their seats and talk amongst themselves. This motion requires a simple majority to pass. The length of an unmoderated caucus in a Crisis committee should not exceed fifteen minutes.

Motion to Suspend the Meeting

This motion is in order if there is a scheduled break in debate to be observed (i.e. Lunch). This motion requires a simple majority vote. The Committee Director may refuse this motion at their discretion.

Motion to Adjourn the Meeting

This motion is in order at the end of the last committee session. It signifies the closing of the committee until next year’s conference.

Points of Order

Points of Order will only be recognized for the following items:

- a) To recognize errors in voting, tabulation, or procedure,
- b) To question relevance of debate to the current Topic or
- c) To question a quorum.

A Point of Order may interrupt a speaker if necessary and it is to be used sparingly.

Points of Inquiry

When there is no discussion on the floor, a delegate may direct a question to the Committee Director. Any question directed to another delegate may only be asked immediately after the delegate has finished speaking on a substantive matter. A delegate that declines to respond to a question after a formal speech forfeits any further questioning time. The question must conform to the following format:

Delegate from Country A raises placard to be recognized by the Committee Director.

Committee Director: "To what point do you rise?"

Country A: "Point of Inquiry."

Committee Director: "State your Point."

Country A: "Will the delegate from Country B (who must have just concluded a substantive speech) yield to a question?"

Committee Director: "Will the Delegate Yield?"

Country B: "I will" or "I will not" (if not, return to the next business item)

Country A asks their question (it must not be a rhetorical question.)

Country B may choose to respond or to decline.

If the Delegate from Country B does not yield to or chooses not to answer a question from Country A, then he/she yields all remaining questioning time to the Committee Director.

Points of Personal Privilege

Points of personal privilege are used to request information or clarification and conduct all other business of the body except Motions or Points specifically mentioned in the Rules of Procedure.

Please note: The Director may refuse to recognize Points of Order, Points of Inquiry or Points of Personal Privilege if the Committee Director believes the decorum and restraint inherent in the exercise has been violated, or if the point is deemed dilatory in nature.

Rights of Reply

At the Committee Director's discretion, any member nation or observer may be granted a Right of Reply to answer serious insults directed at the dignity of the delegate present. The Director has the ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY to accept or reject Rights of Reply, and the decision IS NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL.

Delegates who feel they are being treated unfairly may take their complaint to any member of the Secretariat.

Directives

Directives act as a replacement for Draft Resolutions when in Crisis committees, and are the actions that the body decides to take as a whole. Directives are not required to contain operative or preambulatory clauses. A directive should contain:

- a. The name(s) of the author(s),
- b. A title, and

- c. A number of signatories/sponsors signatures' necessary to introduce, determined by the Director

A simple majority vote is required to introduce a directive, and multiple directives may be introduced at once. Press releases produced on behalf of the body must also be voted on as Directives.

Friendly Amendments

Friendly Amendments are any changes to a formally introduced Directive that *all* Sponsors agree to in writing. The Committee Director must approve the Friendly Amendment and confirm each Sponsor's agreement both verbally and in writing.

Unfriendly Amendments

Unfriendly Amendments are any substantive changes to a formally introduced Directive that are not agreed to by all of the Sponsors of the Directive. In order to introduce an Unfriendly Amendment, the Unfriendly Amendment must be the number equivalent to 1/3 of Quorum confirmed signatories. The Committee Director has the authority to discern between substantive and nonsubstantive Unfriendly amendment proposals.

Plagiarism

GatorMUN maintains a zero-tolerance policy in regards to plagiarism. Delegates found to have used the ideas of others without properly citing those individuals, organizations, or documents will have their credentials revoked for the duration of the GatorMUN conference. This is a very serious offense.

Crisis Notes

A crisis note is an action taken by an individual in a Crisis committee. Crisis notes do not need to be introduced or voted on, and should be given to the Crisis Staff by sending the notes to a designated pickup point in each room. A crisis note should both be addressed to crisis and have the delegate's position on both the inside and outside of the note.

Motion to Enter Voting Procedure

Once this motion passes, and the committee enters Voting Procedure, no occupants of the committee room may exit the Committee Room, and no individual may enter the Committee Room from the outside. A member of the Dias will secure all doors.

- No talking, passing notes, or communicating of any kind will be tolerated during voting procedures.
- Each Directive will be read to the body and voted upon in the order which they were introduced. Any Proposed Unfriendly Amendments to each Directive will be read to the body and voted upon before the main body of the Directive as a whole is put to a vote.
- Delegates who requested to be noted as "Present and Voting" are unable to abstain during voting procedure. Abstentions will not be counted in the tallying of a majority. For example, 5 yes votes, 4 no votes, and 7 abstentions means that the Directive passes.
- The Committee will adopt Directives and Unfriendly Amendments to Directives if these documents pass with a simple majority. Specialized committees should refer to their background guides or Committee Directors for information concerning specific voting procedures.

Roll Call Voting

A counted placard vote will be considered sufficient unless any delegate to the committee motions for a Roll Call Vote. If a Roll Call Vote is requested, the committee must comply. All delegates must vote: "For," "Against," "Abstain," or "Pass." During a Roll Call vote, any delegate who answers, "Pass," reserves his/her vote until the Committee Director has exhausted the Roll. However, once the Committee Director returns to "Passing" Delegates, they must vote: "For" or "Against."

Accepting by Acclamation

This motion may be stated when the Committee Director asks for points or motions. If a Roll Call Vote is requested, the motion to Accept by Acclamation is voided. If a delegate believes a Directive will pass without opposition, he or she may move to accept the Directive by acclamation. The motion passes unless a single delegate shows opposition. An abstention is not considered opposition. Should the motion fail, the committee will move directly into a Roll Call Vote.

A Brief Introduction to Chinese Pronunciation

This committee is focused on the Chinese-speaking world and delegates will inevitably have to deal with various Chinese names while in committee. Thus, it would be useful for delegates to understand the basics of pronouncing these names to avoid potential confusion, especially in cases where they might encounter different spellings of the same name (Cai Yingwen vs. Tsai Ing-wen, for example).

There are two primary ways to transliterate Chinese words. The first, more popular system is the *Hanyu Pinyin* system used by the People's Republic of China. The second system is the older *Wade-Giles* system, which is the most common form used in Taiwan. Committee will operate using a mix of both. Pinyin will be used for names relating to mainland China, while Wade-Giles will be used for names relating to Taiwan, including the names of delegates themselves.

For Hanyu Pinyin, the trickiest letters to pronounce are as follows: *zh-* is pronounced similar to English *j-*, *x-* is pronounced similar to *sh*, *q* is pronounced similar to *ch*, *z-* is pronounced similar to *ds* in 'seeds', and *c-* is pronounced similar to *ts* in 'cats'.¹

Wade-Giles, sadly, has many more tricks to it and at times is inconsistent. The most important things to know are as follows: usually *p-* is pronounced like English "b" while *p'-* is pronounced "p", *ch-* is pronounced like English "j" while *ch'-* is pronounced like English "ch", *k-* is pronounced like English "g" while *k'-* is pronounced like English "k", *t-* is pronounced like English "d" while *t'-* is pronounced like English "t", and *hs-* is pronounced similar to English "sh". Sometimes common words have their apostrophes dropped. For example, T'aiwan and T'aipei are usually spelled as Taiwan and Taipei.

Chinese names are written with family name first, personal name last. So, for example, Tsai Ing-wen's family name is Tsai, so she would be addressed as "President Tsai."



¹ <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~zhuxj/readpinyin.html>, for even more on pronouncing Pinyin: https://resources.allsetlearning.com/chinese/pronunciation/Pinyin_quick_start_guide

Geography of Taiwan

Taiwan is an island of some 12,456 square miles, roughly 1/5th the size of Florida. It was created at the end of the most recent Ice Age when water swept into what is now the Taiwan Strait and separated the island from the mainland. The island of Taiwan is approximately 100 miles away from mainland China, as is clear on any map of the region, but it is also just 60 miles from the southernmost island of Japan and only 100 miles from the northernmost island of the Philippines. Thus, it could be said that Taiwan is the central point between these three nations.

Taiwan itself can be split into two main areas, the western plains region and the eastern mountainous region. The wide, fertile plains of the western third of the island are where most of the population is concentrated, and it is also the place that was first colonized by the Chinese.² The eastern two-thirds of the island is dominated by rugged mountains, and, for the most part, it was ruled by loose groups of indigenous peoples until as late as 1930.³

Besides the island of Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC) rules a few outlying islands. The Pescadores, or Penghu Islands, are the largest outlying cluster of the country, but Taiwan also rules two island groups, the Kinmen and Matsu, that lie just off the mainland of China and have, in previous decades, been subject to shelling from the People's Republic.



Taiwan's capital is the city of Taipei, and it is located on the northern tip of the island. Taipei forms the core of the Taipei-Keelung greater metropolitan area, which includes New Taipei and Keelung City, and it is home to a third of Taiwan's citizens. The second largest metropolitan area is the Taichung-Changhua in north-central Taiwan, and the third largest is Kaohsiung near the southern tip of the island. Taiwan's major railroads and highways run along the western coast of the island through these three metropolitan areas.

Taiwan is located at the intersection of the Philippine Sea and Eurasian tectonic plates, and thus experiences frequent seismic activity. The largest earthquake in recent memory occurred in 1999; a 7.6 magnitude earthquake in central Taiwan that killed over 2,400 people.⁴ The most recent significant earthquake occurred in February of 2018, and it was a 6.4 magnitude earthquake that killed nine people in eastern Taiwan.⁵

2 <https://english.ey.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=1082F2A7077508A4> A great intro to Taiwan geography/demography

3 <https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/first-nations-taiwan-special-report-taiwans-indigenous>

4 <https://www.history.com/topics/natural-disasters-and-environment/1999-taiwan-earthquake>

5 <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/world/asia/taiwan-earthquake-search-survivors.html>

Taiwan is also located in the Northwest Pacific Basin, the region of the world with the most tropical cyclone activity— tropical cyclones are also known as “hurricanes” if they occur in the Atlantic, and “typhoons” if they occur in the Pacific. Typhoons hit the island of Taiwan about three or four times a year, mostly during typhoon season from July to September. The most deadly typhoon in Taiwan’s history was Typhoon Morakot, which killed over 700 people and caused over 300 million USD in damages.⁶

A Brief History of Taiwan

Early History

The early history of Taiwan, as in many areas, is very murky. Since Taiwan was separated from mainland China at the end of the most recent Ice Age it has been home to a wide variety of people. While people surely came from every direction— Taiwan is close not only to mainland China, but also to the Philippines and Japan— the modern-day Aborigines of Taiwan are mostly of Austronesian, South-East Asian origin, and their ancestors inhabited the island thousands of years before any significant Chinese presence manifested itself. These aboriginal people now constitute only 2% of the island’s population, but they once dominated most of the island.

For most of Taiwan’s early history, it was considered by Chinese mainlanders as a barbarian-ridden island of little significance other than as a base for piracy. Various groups from China, such as the Hakka and Hoklo, migrated onto the island in significant numbers from at least the 11th century onward, but the rulers of the mainland would not turn their eyes to controlling the island until the Qing dynasty was founded in 1644— by which point the Dutch had already colonized part of the island themselves.⁷

Dutch Formosa - Qing Period

The Dutch had arrived on the island in 1622, established their own stronghold, Fort Zeelandia, in the southwest of Taiwan, and would later gain a second base at Keelung in northern Taiwan from the Spanish.⁸ They would eventually claim to rule the entire island, which they called Formosa, but their control never extended far beyond the western plains. Even there, most villages under their “rule” were very loosely associated with the Dutch colony, offering occasional tribute in exchange for protection.⁹

The Dutch would be ousted from Taiwan in 1662 not by the Qing, but by the legendary pirate-king Koxinga: a sworn enemy of the Qing who sought to restore power to their predecessors, the Ming dynasty. After facing multiple setbacks in fighting the Qing on the Chinese mainland, Koxinga had decided it was best to retreat to southwestern Taiwan where he established a Ming court-in-exile.¹⁰ He and his successors, also called the Zheng dynasty, would continue to harass the Qing until 1683, when the Qing landed in Taiwan and forced Koxinga’s grandson to submit.¹¹

The Zheng dynasty was a formative time for Taiwan in many ways. Koxinga not only ousted the Dutch from the island, but he also established Chinese-style governance on the island for the first time. Many who were suffering under the Qing migrated to Taiwan over the period of Zheng control, with some historians estimat-

6 <https://www.cwb.gov.tw/V7e/knowledge/encyclopedia/ty000.htm>

7 Manthorpe, Jonathan “Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan”

8 <https://www.colonialvoyage.com/dutch-formosa-1624-1662-1664-1668/>

9 Manthorpe, Jonathan “Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan”

10 <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Zheng-Chenggong>, an interesting read on Koxinga also here: <https://www.economist.com/analects/2012/07/27/contested-legacy>

11 Manthorpe, Jonathan “Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan”

ing that the Chinese population on the island rose from 100,000 to 400,000 over the two-decade span.¹²

Although the Qing took over Taiwan, or at least the western 1/3rd that had been ruled by the Zhengs, they still viewed Taiwan as being a barbarian region of little significance, worth controlling only so that it wouldn't be a center for piracy or anti-Qing sentiments. For two hundred years from 1683 until the 1880s, Taiwan would be considered a far-flung part of the empire, a place run by officials who either could not gain position anywhere else or, more often, were exiled to Taiwan as a punishment. As a result, the government of Taiwan was hopelessly corrupt. Although the ethnic Chinese population would rise from 400,000 to 2 million under Qing rule,¹³ very little was ever done to develop the island, and Taiwanese were treated largely as an underclass. For example, no Taiwanese individual, regardless of ethnicity, could hold a governmental position on the island under the Qing. Due to this bad treatment, along with deep-seated pro-Ming sentiments, there were over 100 recorded rebellions in Taiwan over the 212 year period of Qing rule.¹⁴

In the mid-19th century, the Qing dynasty went into great decline. The Opium Wars of 1839 and 1856 led to great exploitation of China by western powers, while the Taiping Rebellion started in 1850 caused the death of over 20 million people and nearly brought the dynasty to complete collapse. At nearly the same time, Japan was modernizing at a stunning pace and seeking to acquire one of the trappings of any great power of the time—a colony. In pursuit of this goal, Japan launched the first Sino-Japanese war and, in 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was handed to the island of Taiwan.¹⁵

Japanese Rule - Republic of China

After a brief attempt by local Qing officials to set up a “Republic of Formosa” was crushed by Japanese forces, a colonial rule was established on the island that would last until 1945.¹⁶ Under the Japanese, the economy grew spectacularly, public health campaigns greatly improved quality and length of life, and primary-school level education became widely available. At the same time, however, it was still a colonial rule. The Japanese bloodily suppressed rebellions of both the Aborigines and the Chinese of the island, and Taiwanese people as a whole were unable to have much say in government.¹⁷

While the Japanese ruled Taiwan, mainland China was thrown into almost complete chaos. In 1912, the Qing dynasty collapsed and was replaced by the Republic of China. However, this republic held almost no power and China became divided between various warlord factions. In this environment, two key parties arose— the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party. At first, these two parties worked together in the far south of China, developing a modernized army with hopes of reunifying China. After the alliance successfully marched on Shanghai in 1927, however, the KMT under Chiang Kai-shek turned on the Communists and crushed their forces.

Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT would go on to cobble back together most of China through a combination of conquest and co-opting of regional warlords. Soon after this shaky unification occurred, however, Manchuria was invaded by Japan and set up as a puppet state. Japan followed this up in 1937 with a full-fledged invasion of China itself, forcing the KMT and the Communists— who had re-established themselves in rural areas of northwest China— to rehash an uneasy alliance.

After the Japanese were defeated in 1945, the Communists and the KMT found themselves fighting anew.

12 Ibid.

13 <http://www.taiwan-info.de/html/english/TWPAPERe.htm>

14 Manthorpe, Jonathan “Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan”

15 https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php

16 <https://www.britannica.com/place/Taiwan/Cultural-life#ref337517>

17 <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2128067/judging-empires-was-japanese-rule-taiwan-benevolent>

Chiang Kai-shek and many of his close associates in the KMT were extremely corrupt, and the Communists had wide support throughout rural China. KMT cities, surrounded by seas of Communist-supporting areas, fell one by one until 1949 when Chiang and over 2 million other mainlanders— mainly soldiers— fled to make Taiwan into the last bastion of the Republic of China.¹⁸ Although the Republic of China would continue to claim all of China as its territory, from this point onward it was reduced to Taiwan and its neighboring islands.

Those who lived in Taiwan prior to 1949 were not particularly happy to welcome Chiang Kai-shek and his forces. After Taiwan was handed over to the Republic of China in 1945, many of its industries were moved to the mainland and a bungled, corrupt KMT administration left Taiwan with skyrocketing rates of crime and disease. Tensions came to a head in 1947 with the so-called “228 Massacre” in which KMT armies, retaliating against a Taiwanese uprising, engaged in indiscriminate killings intending to “purge” the island of supposed communist rebels.¹⁹ Before Chiang arrived in Taiwan in 1949, he declared martial law, which would not be lifted until the beginning of democratization in 1987. This period from 1947 to 1987 is known as the White Terror, with 140,000 people being imprisoned or executed over this period for real or supposed opposition to the KMT. During this period, the mainlander-heavy KMT kept an iron grip on power with very few local Taiwanese having much say in the governance of the island.

Democratization - Today

Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975 and was succeeded by his son, Chiang Ching-kuo. Ching-kuo, realizing that western countries would be less likely to support an authoritarian country, led Taiwan through a process of democratization. He allowed for more open opposition to KMT rule and brought more local Taiwanese into positions of power, including Lee Teng-hui, his immediate successor. Under Lee, martial law would be lifted, and the first opposition party— the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)— was allowed to form. In 1996, the first free and open presidential elections in the Republic of China were held, with Lee taking 54% of the vote. The election was not all smooth sailing, however. The PRC, fearful of a democratic Taiwan led by an independence-leaning Lee, had spent the months leading up to the election running military drills and firing missiles into the surrounding area of Taiwan’s major ports, sparking panic throughout the island but also supposedly driving many to vote for Teng-hui.²⁰

Democracy in Taiwan would see the DPP ruling from 2000 to 2008 under Chen Shui-bian. It was a rocky administration, with Chen facing a KMT-majority Legislative Yuan and pressures from “deep-green” members of his party, who were disappointed in his pledge to not seek independence as long as the PRC did not attack. His administration ended with a spate of corruption scandals that saw him arrested and jailed after leaving office, and saw his party heavily defeated in the 2008 elections.²¹ The new president, Ma Ying-jeou, would suffer just as much during his tenure from 2008 to 2016. While Ma’s Beijing-friendly policies increased business, he was embroiled in infighting with his own party members and was considered to have bungled various controversial issues, falling to an approval rating of only 9% by 2013.²²

Ma’s grave would truly be dug, however, by the proposed Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), which would have opened up more than 70% of Taiwan’s economy to Chinese investment.²³ The proposed agreement sparked the Sunflower Movement, in which Taiwanese students occupied the Legislative Yuan for 23 days in opposition to the proposal, which they believed would make Taiwan’s economy completely sub-

18 <https://china-journal.org/2018/02/26/why-did-chiang-kai-shek-lose-china-the-guomindang-regime-and-the-victory-of-the-chinese-communist-party/>

19 <https://sentinel.tw/228-massacre-birth-nation/>

20 <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-third-taiwan-strait-crisis-the-forgotten-showdown-19742>

21 <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Chen-Shui-bian>

22 <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2144825/hes-back-ma-ying-jeou-rebuilds-his-popularity-might>

23 <https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2017/07/20/what-was-the-cssta/>

servient to Beijing. The CSSTA was eventually torn up, but in the aftermath of the movement— which had received DPP support— the KMT suffered massive electoral loses in 2014 and 2016, leading to the DPP-controlled government of today.²⁴

Political System of Taiwan

The current government of the Republic of China has five branches— the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan. The Control Yuan is responsible for monitoring other branches of government and has the power to investigate and impeach officials, while the Examination Yuan is responsible for validating the qualification of civil servants. The Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Yuans are the more important of the five, and roughly correspond in function and duty to the same branches in the government of the USA. The head of state for the ROC, the president, is separate from the five branches.²⁵


The Legislative Yuan is unicameral with 113 seats, with 73 seats being determined by a first-past-the-post vote in single-member constituencies similar to the US's system, while another 34 seats are distributed by the percent each party received in the nationwide vote share, and six further seats are specially elected by Aboriginal Taiwanese population. Like the legislative branch in the US, the Legislative Yuan is responsible for passing new laws on a national level and deciding how Taiwan's governmental budget should be allocated.

The Executive Yuan, which committee will be representing, is headed by a Premier and consists of twelve cabinet ministers and various chairpersons, along with the government organizations that they head. There are also a number of “Ministers Without Portfolio” who, despite not holding cabinet-level positions, serve as equal members of the cabinet. The Executive Yuan as a whole is responsible for implementing policy, though it can also recommend policy of its own to be approved by the Legislative Yuan.

Taiwan's Political Parties

Taiwan currently has two main parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). These two parties each lead their own coalition that includes other like-minded parties, with the DPP leading the “Pan-Green” coalition and the KMT leading the “Pan-Blue” coalition, both named for the color most associated with the respective parties. Clashes between the two parties have often become quite heated in the past to the extent that brawling in the Legislative Yuan is a near-regular occurrence.²⁶

The KMT was founded in 1911 by Sun Yat-sen in the lead up to the creation of the Republic of China.²⁷ It led the Republic of China's government from the time that Chiang Kai-shek reunified China in 1928 until it lost the presidential election of 2000. The KMT nowadays are a center-right party



24 <https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/brian-hioe-the-sunflower-movement-4-years-later/>

25 https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_4.php

26 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40640043>

27 <https://alphahistory.com/chineserevolution/guomindang/>

that tends to support Chinese nationalism and closer relations with mainland China.²⁸ The KMT generally has more support in northern Taiwan, urban areas, among mainlanders and their descendants, the military, and among others who benefit greatly from commercial contact with the mainland. The KMT is better organized and better funded than other parties, owing in large part to the experience and assets gained— both legally and illegally— over its long period of one-party rule. In 2014, for example, it was estimated that its revenue was over three times that of the DPP.²⁹



The DPP was founded in 1986 as the KMT's iron grip on Taiwan was loosened. It had its roots in those who opposed the KMT's one-party rule. Many of its early members had at one point or another been arrested or otherwise targeted by the KMT, and the party itself was technically still illegal for the first year after it was founded. It is generally considered a center-left or centrist party, with its greatest difference from the KMT being that it openly disavows reunification with the mainland and supports Taiwanese nationalism— the idea that Taiwanese people are culturally distinct from mainland Chinese.³⁰ The current president, Tsai Ing-wen, is a member of the DPP and the Legislative Yuan is currently DPP-controlled. Most members of the Executive Yuan are either members of the DPP themselves or DPP-associated independents.

Important Issues

International Recognition

Ever since the Chinese Civil War ended with Chiang Kai-shek fleeing to Taiwan, there has been much tension between the Taiwan-based ROC and the mainland-based People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC views Taiwan as an integral part of its territory, and has met any claims that Taiwan is not or should not be a part of the People's Republic of China with threats of invasion. In the past there was a "1992 Consensus" between the Kuomintang and the PRC, in which both agreed that there is one China, but disagree on who might rule it.³¹ The pro-independence DPP, however, does not abide by this policy, and when Tsai Ing-wen took power in 2016 the PRC cut off all official contact with the ROC. In the past two years, the PRC has exercised its vast military and economic power in an attempt to isolate and subordinate the Taiwanese government. It has, for example, increased military demonstrations across the strait and threatened international businesses that list Taiwan as a separate country from China. The current president of China, Xi Jinping, aims to see Taiwan integrated into China by the end of his lifetime, by force if necessary.³²

Currently, a major part of China's pressure campaign is ensuring that Taiwan can not act on the global stage. Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, and in past years has been prevented from working with such bodies as the World Health Organization even as an observer. As of August 2018, the Republic of China only has 17 countries that officially recognize it as a nation, but this number has been continuously shrinking; since Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, for example, five nations have switched recognition to Beijing.³³ Those coun-

28 <https://www.britannica.com/place/Taiwan/Government-and-society>

29 <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/07/24/2003595820>

30 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538>

31 <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-taiwan-relations>

32 <https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/20/asia/taiwan-china-xi-jinping-intl/index.html>

33 <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/08/22/2003698956>

tries that remain attached to Taiwan are all small, with a combined population only twice that of Taiwan and a combined GDP of only a third that of Taiwan.³⁴ Thus, they do not offer much except a small bit of legitimacy and, on rare occasions, a voice for Taiwan in international bodies that Taiwan is not a part of.

Taiwan does have friends beyond these 17 nations, however. The Republic of China maintains unofficial consulates throughout the world, particularly in Western countries and Japan, and has maintained a complex relationship with the U.S. since 1949. In 1979, U.S. Congress passed the “Taiwan Relations Act” which stated that the U.S. will provide defensive arms to Taiwan and will also assist in the event of invasion,³⁵ and in 2018, Congress passed the Taiwan Travel Act which encourages high-level interaction between Taiwanese and American officials.³⁶ It is these larger nations with unofficial relations with Taiwan that offer the most support for Taiwan’s continued existence.

US-China Relations

Taiwan is, in many ways, caught between two world powers. Since being exiled to the island in 1949, the Republic of China’s government has sought US support to defend the island or, when Chiang Kai-shek was still in power, to launch an invasion of the mainland. Although the US stopped recognizing Taiwan as part of its rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China in 1972, it has continued to act as Taiwan’s main deterrent against invasion from the mainland (see the above section Taiwan Relations Act for more information).³⁷

In recent years, the relationship between China and the US has gradually deteriorated before finally dropping into a new era of distrust and uncertainty in 2018, primarily evidenced by the US-China trade war that began on July 6th.³⁸ Increased tensions have led to some pro-Taiwan policies including the Taiwan Travel Act, but the uncertainty of US-China relations also means uncertainty for those countries caught between the two powers.³⁹ In such uncertainty, over-reliance on the US is potentially dangerous, and if it continues, Taiwan may end up a pawn in the larger US-China conflict.

Brain Drain, Dependence, and Development

In recent times, Taiwan has faced a unique mix of economic issues. One issue is that, as China grows its economic power, Taiwan is becoming more and more economically dependent on the mainland. In the past this was reflected mostly in the outsourcing of Taiwanese factories to the mainland, but nowadays it is also reflected in the brain drain crisis Taiwan faces as many of its best and brightest are attracted to the high wages and dynamic lifestyle they can more easily obtain in the mainland.⁴⁰ The PRC offers a variety of incentives for Taiwanese people to come work on the mainland in hopes of advancing its goal of reunification, and to a large extent they have been working there, leaving Taiwan with a potential shortage of talent.⁴¹

Labor shortage issues are compounded by an aging population and a shift from low-skilled manufacturing to high-skilled manufacturing and service industries. Filling the low-skilled labor gap created by these dual issues is a population of approximately 680,000 migrant workers, mostly from Southeast Asia.⁴² These laborers

34 <https://international.thenewslens.com/article/96443>

35 <https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/>

36 <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/the-taiwan-travel-act-in-context/>

37 <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/rapprochement-china>

38 <http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2018/09/10/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline.html>

39 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/30/china-u-s-taiwan-relations-are-in-choppy-waters-heres-whats-going-on/?utm_term=.eb07679a52d0

40 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taiwan-battles-a-brain-drain-as-china-aims-to-woo-young-talent-away/2018/04/13/338d096e-3940-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story.html?utm_term=.fbb220f7f643

41 <http://time.com/4906162/taiwan-brain-drain-youth-china-jobs-economy/>

42 https://international.thenewslens.com/article/102510?utm_source=2016IndexHot&utm_medium=internal&utm_campaign=hot_post

have historically been treated unfairly by those who hire them, and recently it has led to protests throughout Taiwan in support of their rights.⁴³

Taiwan's economy is also extremely export-heavy, with over 40% of its exports going to China and Hong Kong, making it extremely sensitive to any potential efforts by China to force reunification through economic means.⁴⁴ One illuminating example of the dangers of economic dependence on mainland China came in August of 2018. During a transit-stop in the US, Tsai Ing-Wen was photographed receiving a gift from workers at a Taiwan-based coffee chain called 85°C Café. Soon afterward, mainland nationalists began calling for a boycott of the chain, leading to a sharp decline in the company's stock prices and forcing the mainland branch of the company to issue a statement rejecting Taiwanese independence.⁴⁵ To try to combat economic dependence, Tsai Ing-wen has launched the "New Southbound Policy," through which Taiwan seeks to forge strong economic ties with the countries of South-East Asia, such as the Philippines and Malaysia.⁴⁶

Chinese Competition and Cyberattacks

As China has grown as an economy, it has not only threatened Taiwan using brain drain, but also using direct economic competition in industries that Taiwan depends on— and competition is not necessarily fair. In particular, China has been trying to develop a strong domestic semiconductor industry; semiconductors are a key component of much modern day technology, such as smartphones.⁴⁷ Taiwan has historically dominated the semiconductor industry, and moves by the PRC to compete with Taiwan may have a serious impact on Taiwan's economy.^{48 49} In terms of not playing fairly, China has aggressively sought technological acquisitions— the know-how of producing the most advanced semiconductors— and have in recent years sought such acquisitions not just through the straight purchase of other semiconductor companies, but also through aggressive lawsuits, bribing of rival engineers for industrial secrets, and cyber attacks.⁵⁰ On August 3rd, 2018, Taiwan's largest company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., was affected by a virus that caused up to half a billion dollars worth of damage. While the company claims this virus was not a targeted attack, it shows the vulnerability of Taiwan's economy to potential attacks.⁵¹

Cyber espionage is evident well beyond industry, however. Every month, Taiwan's government must deal with at least 10 million cyber attacks— many of which come from mainland China.⁵² Most of these attacks are small and do little to no harm, but major, harmful attacks are becoming increasingly common. For example, the DPP website was hacked and brought down on July 3rd, 2018, with similar threats made to bring down the KMT's website,⁵³ and a significant body of evidence points to targeted attacks from the mainland on Taiwan's high-tech and telecommunications industries.⁵⁴

43 <https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/taiwans-migrant-workers-are-finding-their-voice/>

44 <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-taiwan-economy-breakingviews/taiwan-not-china-is-its-own-worst-enemy-idUSKBN17Q0QL>

45 <https://www.whatsonweibo.com/bakery-boycott-over-taiwan-issue-the-85c-cafe-controversy/>

46 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-engagement-with-southeast-asia-is-making-progress-under-the-new-southbound-policy/>

47 <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-29/why-can-t-china-make-semiconductors-jglgice5>

48 <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2017/11/09/an-upstart-upstream-high-tech-sector-in-china-threatens-now-dominant-taiwan/#575d9c2b5930>

49 <https://www.scmp.com/business/global-economy/article/2143625/taiwans-economy-burns-less-brightly-its-tiger-peers>

50 <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/technology/china-micron-chips-theft.html>

51 <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-08-06/now-maybe-taiwan-will-take-cybersecurity-seriously>

52 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-cybersecurity/chinese-cyber-attacks-on-taiwan-government-becoming-harder-to-detect-source-idUSKBN1JB17L>

53 <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3473203>

54 <https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-comnie-continues-target-organizations-east-asia/>

Important Points

Before concluding, I would like to make some final points to make expectations as clear as possible.

What is the timeframe of committee?

The committee will start on the actual date of our first session, January 25th, 2019. We will try to cover roughly three months of time every session, so that the end of our fourth session coincides with Taiwan's presidential election, which occurs in January of 2020, with the final session covering the time between the election and the inauguration (January to May).

What kind of committee is this?

This committee will be focused on addressing a variety of domestic and international problems plaguing Taiwan. Often, delegates will be forced to deal with both at the same time— many domestic problems in Taiwan have international roots and vice versa. This committee will not be a war committee. Defense will be an important topic of debate, but any actual fighting is unlikely, and in the case that it does occur, the ROC forces will not be controlled by the committee.

What is the goal of committee?

The goals of individuals will vary from person to person, but the basic uniting goal of committee is to help Taiwan survive and thrive. This means ensuring that Taiwan maintains a healthy and vibrant democracy, and a strong economy without heavy dependence on outside powers. This also means, for most delegates, ensuring that the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen win the 2020 elections so that the DPP will move closer to fulfilling its long-term goal of Taiwanese independence.

What should I know for committee?

You should know two main things. Firstly, you should know Taiwan's place within the international community at large and in relation to regional players in East Asia. It will be particularly helpful to understand why the U.S. and the PRC act the way they do towards Taiwan, along with what Taiwan's goals might be in relation to both.

Secondly, you should be aware of the domestic issues that plague Taiwan and how they can or cannot be related to Taiwan's international situation. Besides overarching crises that all of committee must address, each delegate should also have an idea what problems their ministries individually might face.

What are the powers of committee?

The committee will represent a meeting of the Executive Yuan, with the chair of the committee acting as Premier William Lai. The Executive Yuan, through joint directive, will be able to do the following (this list is not exhaustive):

- Coordinate their individual powers
- Give orders to parts of the Executive Yuan not represented in committee
- Make requests of Tsai Ing-wen, who acts as head of state and general-in-chief.
- Send recommendations or requests to the Legislative Yuan, including budgetary ones.

Conclusion

Taiwan's situation is unique within the international community. A limbo-state with roots in the collapse of the Ming Dynasty brought into the limelight by the KMT's retreat from China's mainland, Taiwan's governance has long been a thorny issue on an international level. After democratization, many residents of the island have sought to take the issue into their own hands. The current ruling government was born out of, and led to electoral success by, the dream of an independent Taiwan. Nowadays, a majority of the island's residents identify not as "Chinese" but as "Taiwanese," and just in the past few years various pushes have been made to have referendums on eliminating the name "Republic of China." At the same time, pressure from the People's Republic of China is the strongest it has been in years, with Beijing attacking on multiple fronts to ensure that the DPP's dream of an internationally recognized independent Taiwan will not come to pass. If independence were proclaimed now, the island would almost certainly face immediate invasion from the mainland.

If committee hopes to succeed, it must have a firm grasp on both dream and reality; it must work towards the dreams that it has promised the electorate while maintaining caution towards the reality of potential invasion or reprisal. It must also ensure that the heart of the nation— the people of Taiwan— are not neglected in the struggle to achieve true independence.

Positions

The Executive Yuan consists of the leaders of various ministries and councils, as well as various other officials who serve as “Ministers without Portfolio,” primarily advisory but in some cases concurrently holding powerful positions of their own. The positions as they stand now are based on the current members of the Executive Yuan. All but one of the ministers are either members of the DPP or Independents who affiliate with the DPP.

Minister of Interior, Hsu Kuo-yung (徐國勇)

Responsible for home affairs and security, Hsu is in charge of not only policing, but also various smaller government functions such as census taking, monitoring of local elections, and land surveys. Before being tapped to become Minister of Interior in July of 2018, Hsu served first as a DPP legislator in the Legislative Yuan, and then as the Executive Yuan spokesperson— responsible for explaining new policies to the public at large.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Wu (吳釗燮)

Responsible for relations with all foreign countries except the People’s Republic of China. Besides official ties with countries that recognize Taiwan, the ministry maintains unofficial ties with various national governments, in part through “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Offices” (TECRO) around the world that operate as unofficial consulates. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Ohio State University, and he has previously headed the Washington, D.C. TECRO.

Minister of National Defense, Yen Teh-fa (嚴德發)

Responsible for all defense and military affairs, Yen is in charge of making sure Taiwan’s defense forces— land, sea, and air—are kept at full capability in the face of Chinese pressures. Outside of being a minister, Yen is a retired three-star army general who is most famous for helping lead disaster-relief efforts after a serious Typhoon hit in 2009.

Minister of Finance, Su Jian-rong (許虞哲)

Responsible for taxation, customs, and running the treasury, the Ministry of Finance also manages state-owned land/property. Minister Sheu received a doctoral degree in economics from Pennsylvania State University, and has spent almost his entire career working his way up in the Ministry of Finance.

Minister of Education, Yeh Jiunn-rong (葉俊榮)

Responsible for managing public schools and the formulation and implementation of education policy. The Ministry of Education runs a wide variety of programs and institutions, from the various national museums to “Overseas Education Divisions” that assist overseas students. Yeh holds a doctoral degree in law from Yale University and has spent much of his life as a lecturer in various places such as the US, Canada, and mainland China. He originally joined the Executive Yuan as the Minister of Interior in 2016, but in July of 2018 was shifted to take over a vacancy as Minister of Education.

Minister of Justice, Tsai Ching-hsiang (蔡清祥)

Responsible for carrying out Taiwan's judicial functions, the Ministry of Justice is also associated with anti-corruption efforts. The Ministry of Justice includes the Investigation Bureau, which is Taiwan's domestic counter-intelligence agency. Tsai was tapped to become Minister of Justice in July of 2018 owing to his overall success as director of the Investigation Bureau, most notably his success in busting various drug rings.

Minister of Economic Affairs Shen Jong-chin (沈榮津)

Responsible for formulating policy and laws for industry and trade, foreign direct investment, and intellectual properties. The ministry also manages Taiwan's state-owned companies, including the Taiwan Power Company, which runs the country's power grid. The ministry's main goal is to increase employment and promote investment in critical sectors of Taiwan's economy. Shen Jong-chin has previously held a wide variety of positions related to industrial development, including positions within the Ministry of Economic Affairs itself.

Minister of Transportation and Communications, Wu Hong-mo (吳宏謀)

Responsible for policy, regulation, and administration of transportation and communications networks, with the exception of the Taipei railway system. This ministry also includes the Central Weather Bureau and the Tourism Bureau, meaning it handles meteorological operations and tourism development. Wu holds a doctorate degree in marine engineering from Sun Yat-sen University, and has previously served as head of the state-owned Taiwan International Ports Corporation, which manages the nation's major ports.

Minister of Labor Hsu Ming-chun (許銘春)

Responsible for reviewing and implementing labor policies, laws, and regulations. The Ministry of Labor also leads various vocational training programs, manages labor insurance, runs Taiwan's OSHA, and determines the minimum wage. Hsu received her bachelor's degree in law from National Taiwan University and has previously served in various positions in the Kaohsiung City government, including Deputy Mayor.

Minister of Health and Welfare Chen Shi-chung (陳時中)

Responsible for both managing the public health system and the national welfare system. In regards to public health, the ministry is responsible for the public health system, hospitals, pharmacies, the universal health cares system, and other health-related functions. In regards to welfare, the ministry handles Taiwan's social security system, as well as all of its social work. Chen Shi-chung holds a dentistry degree from the Taipei Medical College and was a director at Taipei Medical University from 2004 to 2017.

Minister of Culture Cheng Li-chun (鄭麗君)

Responsible for promoting cultural and creative industries and maintaining the National Repository of Cultural Heritage. The Ministry runs a variety of museums and arts centers in Taiwan, along with Cultural Centers in New York, Paris, and Tokyo. It not only supervises Taiwan's popular culture industries— TV, movies, music, etc.— but also promotes the industries by sponsoring shows and festivals both domestic and abroad. Cheng Li-chun gained her master's degree at Paris Nanterre University in France and served in the Legislative Yuan from 2012 to 2016.

Minister of Science and Technology Chen Liang-gee (陳良基)

Responsible for promoting and funding scientific research and technological adaptation in one of Asia's most tech-heavy countries. Beyond assisting other entities, the ministry runs various science parks and laboratories of its own. Chen has a doctoral degree from National Cheng Kung University in electrical engineering and served as a professor at National Taiwan University.

Head of Agriculture Council, Lin Tsung-hsien (林聰賢)

Responsible for overseeing agricultural, forestry, fishery, animal husbandry, state-sponsored biotechnical initiatives, and general food affairs. The son of farmers, Lin holds a master's degree from Fo Guang University and was the magistrate of Yilan County from 2009 to 2017.

Head of Environmental Protection Administration, Lee Ying-yuan (李應元)

Responsible for Taiwan's environmental policies, regulations, standards, and enforcement, the EPA manages everything from toxic material handling to noise pollution prevention. Lee Ying-yuan has a master's degree in health policy from Harvard University and a Ph.D. in health economics from the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. Due to his political affiliations, he was blacklisted from returning to Taiwan by the ruling Kuomintang during the martial law period and was arrested upon his return in 1991. After his release in 1992, he became an influential member of the DPP, being elected to the Legislative Yuan twice while also serving a brief stint as the DPP's Secretary-General in 2008.

Head of Veterans Affairs Council, Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正)

Responsible for caring for the retired servicemen and women of the ROC's Armed Forces. This not only includes responsibility for retirement payments and health care but also a duty to help educate and employ veterans. The Veterans Affairs Council runs its own general hospital as well as various for-profit enterprises, such as bus companies and farms, that are used to employ veterans. Chiu Kuo-cheng, a retired general who has previously served as Chief of the General Staff for the ROC Armed Forces, is currently the only high-level Executive Yuan official affiliated with the Kuomintang.

Head of Mainland Affairs Council, Chen Ming-Tong (陳明通)

Responsible for developing relations with mainland China and with advising the central government on mainland affairs. The Mainland Affairs Council is in charge of cultivating educational and economic ties with the mainland that benefit Taiwan's interests. It also indirectly administrates the Straits Exchange Foundation, which is the official intermediary used by the ROC to negotiate with the PRC. Chen holds a doctoral degree in political science from National Taiwan University and first headed the Mainland Affairs Council from 2007 to 2008.

Head of Council of Indigenous Peoples, Icyang Parod (夷將·拔路兒)

Responsible for serving the needs of Taiwan's indigenous populations as well as serving as the main line of communication between indigenous communities and the government. The Council works to preserve the cultures and languages of indigenous groups while also improving their economic and political status. Icyang is a member of the Amis tribe, the largest ethnicity of indigenous peoples. He also has a long history of tribal activism both inside and outside the DPP, having previously served as the Head of Council in 2007-2008.

Minister w/o Portfolio, “Digital Minister”, Audrey Tang (唐鳳)

Responsible for ensuring the government has modern, digital channels through which it can communicate with its citizens— both spreading information and receiving input from citizens. Audrey Tang is an openly transgender software engineer and hacker who is known as the “Digital Minister.” She is a self-taught Internet prodigy who, after retiring from her own startup company at age 33, became the youngest minister in the cabinet at age 35. As “Digital Minister” she runs vTaiwan and Join, two open-source platforms for government consultation, and works closely with the hackers of g0v, a transparency of information community cofounded by Tang during the Sunflower Movement.

Minister w/o Portfolio, Governor of Taiwan Province, Wu Tze-cheng (吳澤成): Wu is currently the appointed governor of Taiwan Province, a mostly rural area which comprises approximately 69% of the ROC’s land area and 31% of its population. Although Wu’s position is largely ceremonial, he can still attempt to influence the county officials below him. Perhaps of greater significance, Wu also heads the Public Construction Commission, an Executive Yuan body that plans and supervises public construction projects such as highways, roads, and bridges. Wu holds a master’s degree in construction engineering and management from National Central University, and previously served as Deputy-Magistrate of Yilan county under Lin Tsung-hsien, the current Minister of Agriculture, from 2009 to 2017.

Minister w/o Portfolio, Mayor of Taipei, Ko Wen-je (柯文哲): Ko is the elected leader of Taipei, the capital and the economic, political, and cultural center of Taiwan and the homeplace of more than 1/10th of Taiwan’s population. As mayor, he is not only the face of Taipei, but also the head of a government that, in many respects, acts as a municipal-level Executive Yuan with various departments implementing local policies. Before becoming mayor, Ko was a renowned surgeon at National Taiwan University Hospital and a professor at National Taiwan University College of Medicine. Ko is a close friend with James Soong, the leader of the small People’s First Party, and it has been heavily speculated that Ko might make a 2020 presidential run with him.

Head of Ocean Affairs Council, Hwung Hwung-hweng (黃煌輝)

Responsible for coordinating and implementing marine-related policies, the council, founded in early 2018, has three major organizational components. The first, the Coast Guard Administration, is responsible for enforcing maritime law and patrolling Taiwan’s coasts. The second, the Ocean Conservation Administration, is responsible for marine ecological conservation and sustainable management of marine resources. The third, the National Ocean Research Institute, is responsible for maritime-related research and maritime education outreach. Before heading the Ocean Affairs Council, Hwung served as chairman of the Aviation Safety Council and as president of National Cheng Kung University, a top-ranking university in South- Western Taiwan.

Head of Overseas Community Affairs Council, Wu Hsin-hsing (吳新興)

Responsible for acting as a bridge between Taiwan and overseas communities of Taiwanese and Chinese descent, OCAS runs various programs not just to educate and assist the Taiwanese/Chinese diaspora, but also to attract talent and resources from the diaspora to Taiwan. The council runs various service centers throughout Asia, as well as in Europe, North and South America, and Oceania, from which they keep in contact with local diaspora communities. Before becoming head of OCAS, Wu Hsin-hsing earned a bachelor’s degree in international relations from New Mexico State University and a doctorate degree in political science from the University of Melbourne, and he also served as head of a special delegation to the Philippines from 2003 to 2008.

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